Net Neutrality is an issue that began as a policy monopoly in a small venue and eventually developed into a part of the government agenda in 2006. When a political opportunity presented itself, the issue of net neutrality moved from the government agenda to the decision agenda.
Net Neutrality is an example of a policy monopoly that was gradually eroded. Before 2005, there was no alternative to the government’s status quo policy and most people outside the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) did not discuss the issue. This allowed a specific group, the FCC, to exert considerable influence over the issue and maintain a policy monopoly. In Instability in American Politics, Baumgartner and Jones follow the erosion of the nuclear policy monopoly in order to identify two forces which help break down policy monopolies: changes in the image of an issue and the venue in which that issue is being considered. From 2005 to 2006 the policy monopoly over the issue of net neutrality was destroyed because its image in the public changed and the venue it was considered in expanded
Two key developments contributed to the expansion of the policy venue in which net neutrality was being considered. In 2002 the Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators (CBUI) was formed (Greenfield 2006) and by 2003 the group included companies like Yahoo! and Microsoft. This was the first time an interest group had formed in opposition to the government’s status quo policy on net neutrality. In 2003, a small internet provider sought access to a larger cable companies’ network as a public good, but the FCC said the cable company had private ownership over their network. In 2005 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in National Cable and Telecomm. Assn v. Brand X Internet Services (Brand X) that the FCC was right in allowing cable companies to have private ownership over their networks (Oyez 2006). By 2005 the Supreme Court’s ruling and the formation of a powerful interest group took the issue of net neutrality and ownership of networks outside the confines of FCC regulatory meetings, where the issue had survived since before 2004 (Greenfield 2006), and brought the issue into focus for a wider public and into the halls of Congress.
The expansion of a venue coincided with the development of a new public image toward net neutrality. By 2005 large corporations like Yahoo! and Microsoft had staked out a claim in opposition to network provider’s rights to monopolize internet access. As the issue was discussed in the public, the “neutrality” position gained popularity. A New York Times editorial suggested without net neutrality we would “stifle promising innovations” and that this was a time for the “public interest” should “trump the special interests.” (NYT 2006) In the Press the issue began to be covered with a David and Goliath theme. Even the name net neutrality implies that the opposition is not neutral, unfair or even corrupt. Baumgartner and Jones’ work argues that “changes in venue reinforce changes in image” (Baum/Jones 13) such that as an image becomes viewed more negatively it begins to show up in more venues (the media, courts, and Congress) and the more people learn about the issue the more they dislike it (which helps expand the venue even further). This is exactly what happened with net neutrality in 2005. As interest groups brought the issue to Congress and out of small FCC meetings a negative image began to be associated with private network control. Net neutrality became an issue only when it began to be viewed negatively by the public. After the status quo is no longer accepted and the policy monopoly deteriorates an alternative policy is necessary to address what the public begins to see as a problem.
The change in venue and image in 2005 eroded the policy monopoly over net neutrality and when an alternative policy developed the issue of net neutrality moved onto the government agenda. Kingdon describes the government agenda as “subjects people in and around government are paying serious attention to.” (Kingdon 13) Policy monopolies do not appear on the government agenda because a policy monopoly implies that there is little disagreement about how an issue should be dealt with, and therefore people in government are not seriously considering changing that policy. Once a policy monopoly is destroyed however, an issue moves onto the government agenda because there is a need to reconsider a position. Without this need there is no reason to discuss an issue, which is why net neutrality remained off the government agenda until the issue became polarized with differentiated points of view. In 2005 the issue of net neutrality moved onto the government agenda because alternatives were being discussed in congressional committees.
In order for net neutrality to move from being considered on the government agenda to being voted on the decision agenda a policy window had to open. Kingdon identifies three different streams that must be coupled to open a policy window: a political stream, the politics that affect a decision, the problem stream, how and why an issue becomes a problem that must be addressed, and a policy stream, the available policy alternatives (Kingdon 13).In 2006 the problem of net neutrality was evident to policymakers and an alternate policy was being advanced by interest groups, the policy and problem streams were active. The remaining challenge was to couple the political stream with the policy and problem streams.
The passage of related legislation helped make net neutrality politically possible and opened a policy window for net neutrality legislation. Passing one piece of legislation can help open a policy window for another piece of related legislation. Kingdon describes this “spillover” effect as the “increase in probability that a window will open for another similar subject” after a piece of legislation is passed (Kingdon 25). The spillover effect can help align the political stream with the policy and problem streams because it puts issues onto the decision agenda that relates issues can be tied to. This is what occurred when Congress considered the Advanced Telecommunications and Opportunities Reform Act of 2006 (ATORA), a piece of legislation that sought to deregulate the telecommunications industry (NYT 2006). This act was politically viable and opened the window for consideration of related measures like net neutrality. The spillover effect helped couple the three streams together by uniting the political stream with an existing policy that answered a recognized problem. The last remaining piece was a political entrepreneur, what Kingdon describes as “advocates willing to expend resources” (Kingdon 19) to advance a particular issue. Without an individual in Congress advancing a specific position, issues cannot be put onto the decision agenda. A political entrepreneur is an essential part of aligning the political stream with a specific policy in the policy stream. Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) expended his political capital in order to advance an amendment to ATORA which advocated for net neutrality standards (NYT 2006). The spillover effect and a political entrepreneur worked together to couple the political stream. The introduction of the amendment was the final blow to the policy monopoly that had dominated net neutrality. The policy window that had been opened by the coupled streams enabled net neutrality to move from the government agenda to the decision agenda, and ultimately reach a floor vote in the House of Representatives.
The issue of net neutrality moved onto the decision agenda from 2005 to 2006 through a process that combines the models proposed by Baumgartner and Jones and Kingdon. In 2006, three coupled streams (a political reality and a policy addressing a recognized problem) produced a policy window for a decision on net neutrality legislation as Kingdon’s model suggests is necessary. But Kingdon’s model does not provide a convincing framework for considering how an issue comes to be on the government agenda in the first place. Prior to 2002 net neutrality was not being seriously considered in circles of government. Net neutrality moved onto the decision agenda by following a model which combines the strengths of Baumgartner and Jones with the weakness in Kingdon’s policy model. Most government policies exist in a policy monopoly – there is only one position on the issue – and do not sit on the government agenda. When a policy monopoly begins to erode, through a process of changing images and expanding venues, alternative policies are considered. The issue moves from the control of a policy monopoly onto the government agenda and ultimately fits into Kingdon’s analytic framework. Future legislative action can be taken on the issue of net neutrality because the policy monopoly has evaporated. Kingdon’s model suggests that it will move back onto the decision agenda only when the politics stream is coupled with the policy and problem streams.
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